Entra External ID: Fresh step-up MFA for protected API actions with Security Defaults enabled

Günther Schlögl 0 Reputation points
2026-11-20T04:38:25.89+00:00

We are developing a healthcare practice management application using Microsoft Entra External ID (customer tenant).

Current architecture:

  • Public Windows desktop application using MSAL.

Delegated access to a protected Web API.

Microsoft Entra External ID as the existing identity provider.

Security Defaults are enabled and must remain enabled.

Sensitive administrative actions require an additional, recent strong authentication confirmation.

The backend must verify this confirmation server-side.

Verified problem:

A matching Microsoft sign-in log shows successful password-only authentication ("Password in the cloud"). Conditional Access was not applied.

The corresponding API access token did not contain the required amr and auth_time claims. Our backend therefore correctly refuses the protected operation with HTTP 403.

The exact first server-side rejection branch was not recorded, but the absence of fresh MFA is confirmed.

We have investigated authentication contexts and MSAL claims challenges. However, our tenant currently has no configured authentication contexts or Conditional Access policies.

Microsoft indicates that configuring Conditional Access policies requires disabling Security Defaults. We do not want to weaken our existing tenant security.

Our questions:

Is there a Microsoft-supported way to require fresh, action-specific MFA or passkey authentication while keeping Security Defaults enabled in an Entra External ID customer tenant?

Can our backend reliably verify that strong authentication occurred within the previous five minutes specifically for the protected operation, rather than accepting an earlier authenticated session?

Which signed token claims or supported mechanisms provide verifiable proof of the authentication method, freshness, user identity, application and resource binding?

Would passkeys using Windows Hello be suitable? What enrollment prerequisites apply, and can this work without purchasing additional hardware or requiring a second smartphone?

Can the same security architecture support both the Windows desktop client and a browser-based PWA?

Is a solution available without additional licensing costs or disabling Security Defaults?

If this is not supported with Security Defaults enabled, please confirm the limitation and identify the officially supported alternatives, including their licensing and security implications.

We want to retain Microsoft Entra External ID and our existing backend authorization controls. We are not looking for a custom authentication system or a reduction in security.

Official Microsoft documentation references would be particularly helpful.We are developing a healthcare practice management application using Microsoft Entra External ID (customer tenant).

Current architecture:

Public Windows desktop application using MSAL.

Delegated access to a protected Web API.

Microsoft Entra External ID as the existing identity provider.

Security Defaults are enabled and must remain enabled.

Sensitive administrative actions require an additional, recent strong authentication confirmation.

The backend must verify this confirmation server-side.

Verified problem:

A matching Microsoft sign-in log shows successful password-only authentication ("Password in the cloud"). Conditional Access was not applied.

The corresponding API access token did not contain the required amr and auth_time claims. Our backend therefore correctly refuses the protected operation with HTTP 403.

The exact first server-side rejection branch was not recorded, but the absence of fresh MFA is confirmed.

We have investigated authentication contexts and MSAL claims challenges. However, our tenant currently has no configured authentication contexts or Conditional Access policies.

Microsoft indicates that configuring Conditional Access policies requires disabling Security Defaults. We do not want to weaken our existing tenant security.

Our questions:

Is there a Microsoft-supported way to require fresh, action-specific MFA or passkey authentication while keeping Security Defaults enabled in an Entra External ID customer tenant?

Can our backend reliably verify that strong authentication occurred within the previous five minutes specifically for the protected operation, rather than accepting an earlier authenticated session?

Which signed token claims or supported mechanisms provide verifiable proof of the authentication method, freshness, user identity, application and resource binding?

Would passkeys using Windows Hello be suitable? What enrollment prerequisites apply, and can this work without purchasing additional hardware or requiring a second smartphone?

Can the same security architecture support both the Windows desktop client and a browser-based PWA?

Is a solution available without additional licensing costs or disabling Security Defaults?

If this is not supported with Security Defaults enabled, please confirm the limitation and identify the officially supported alternatives, including their licensing and security implications.

We want to retain Microsoft Entra External ID and our existing backend authorization controls. We are not looking for a custom authentication system or a reduction in security.

Official Microsoft documentation references would be particularly helpful.

Microsoft Security | Microsoft Entra | Microsoft Entra External ID

2 answers

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  1. AI answer

    2026-11-20T04:39:40.9066667+00:00

    Security Defaults cannot enforce fresh, action-specific MFA for your API; the supported External ID design is Conditional Access authentication context, which requires disabling Security Defaults and replacing its baseline protections with Conditional Access policies.^1^

    What Security Defaults can and cannot prove

    Security Defaults is a Microsoft-managed baseline. Microsoft decides when MFA is necessary based on factors such as the location, device, role, and task. It does not expose controls for:

    • Mapping an MFA requirement to one protected API operation.
    • Forcing reauthentication within five minutes of that operation.
    • Selecting or requiring passkeys.
    • Configuring authentication contexts or sign-in frequency.

    Consequently, an access token obtained under Security Defaults might represent password-only authentication, as you observed. Repeating an MSAL interactive acquisition or adding a claims challenge cannot create an authentication requirement when no corresponding Conditional Access policy and authentication context exist.

    Do not treat these claims as substitutes:

    • iat proves when the token was issued, not when MFA occurred.
    • amr, when present, describes authentication methods but does not bind MFA to the protected operation or establish a five-minute policy.
    • auth_time, when present, represents an authentication time but does not by itself prove that the authentication satisfied your action-specific security requirement.
    • acr/acrs proves a configured authentication context was satisfied. This is the appropriate authorization signal for step-up, but it only exists as a useful guarantee when backed by the relevant Conditional Access policy.^2^

    Supported action-specific architecture

    For Microsoft-hosted authentication—or BYO UX where its preview status is acceptable—the supported sequence is:

    1. Disable Security Defaults.
    2. Recreate its baseline using Conditional Access:
      • Require MFA for the necessary customer applications/users.
      • Protect tenant administrators separately.
      • Preserve legacy-authentication and device-code-flow protections where the external-tenant feature set permits them.
      • Maintain emergency-access exclusions.
    3. Under Entra ID → Protection → Conditional Access → Authentication contexts, create an authentication context, for example C1: Sensitive administrative operation.
    4. Create a Conditional Access policy targeting that authentication context and requiring MFA.
    5. Map each sensitive API operation to C1.
    6. Have the API inspect the validated access token for the matching acrs value.
    7. If absent, return 401 Unauthorized with the documented WWW-Authenticate claims challenge.
    8. Have both clients pass that challenge to MSAL and repeat the API request with the resulting access token.

    External ID explicitly supports additional verification after sign-in through configured authentication context for Microsoft-hosted authentication and BYO UX. Embedded native authentication does not support later-operation step-up or passkeys.^3^

    The API check is conceptually:

    var contextSatisfied = User.FindAll("acrs")
        .Any(c => c.Value == requiredContext);
    
    if (!contextSatisfied)
    {
        Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status401Unauthorized;
        Response.Headers.WWWAuthenticate =
            BuildClaimsChallenge(requiredContext);
        return;
    }
    
    await ExecuteSensitiveOperation();
    

    The production implementation should generate the complete documented challenge and obtain tenant-specific context mappings rather than hard-code them.^2^

    Five-minute freshness

    Authentication context proves that the configured policy was satisfied, but it is not independently a five-minute timer. Freshness must be enforced through Conditional Access session controls and compatible token acquisition behavior:

    • Sign-in frequency: Every time requires full reauthentication when the session is evaluated, but includes five minutes of clock skew and therefore does not mean “MFA occurred no more than exactly five minutes ago.”
    • Every time strict has a shorter 10-second validity window, but is currently preview and requires the application to request a new token for the sensitive action. Applying the policy alone is insufficient if the application continues using an existing token or session.^4^

    Therefore, an exact, generally available “MFA in the preceding five minutes specifically for this operation” guarantee is not documented for this configuration. The closest supported designs are:

    • Authentication context plus Every time, accepting its documented evaluation and clock-skew semantics.
    • Authentication context plus Every time strict, if preview features are acceptable and testing confirms support for your application flow.

    The API should still perform ordinary token validation: signature, issuer, lifetime, expected tenant, API audience, delegated scope, user subject, and authorized client application. Microsoft specifically requires validating audience, tenant, subject, and actor; access tokens are validated by the API, not the public client.^5^

    Passkeys and Windows Hello

    Passkeys are suitable as a phishing-resistant MFA method, but External ID currently cannot require them through a Conditional Access authentication strength. A policy can require MFA, and an enrolled user can choose a passkey to satisfy it.^6^

    For Windows Hello:

    • No separate FIDO2 hardware key or second smartphone is required.
    • A device-bound passkey can be held in Windows Hello and unlocked using a PIN, fingerprint, or face.
    • The customer must use a supported Windows version and WebAuthn-capable browser.
    • Currently, only email-plus-password or username-plus-password local accounts can register passkeys.
    • The user must first complete MFA, within the previous five minutes, to register one.
    • Your application must provide a credential-management experience.
    • Passkeys must be enabled in Entra ID → Security → Authentication methods → Policies → Passkey (FIDO2).
    • Windows Hello device-bound passkeys require the applicable Windows Hello AAGUIDs to be allowed; attestation must not be enforced for the documented Windows registration scenario.^7^

    This enrollment requirement creates a bootstrap issue: an existing MFA method is required before the first passkey can be registered. You therefore need at least one supported initial method, such as email OTP, TOTP, or SMS where applicable. SMS is an additional-cost External ID feature.^8^

    Desktop client and PWA

    The same API authorization model can support both:

    • The Windows public client handles the WWW-Authenticate challenge through MSAL and Microsoft-hosted browser authentication.
    • The browser PWA uses an OAuth/OIDC browser flow and handles the same claims challenge.
    • Both request tokens for the same API and the API enforces the same aud, tid, scp, client identity, user identity, and acrs requirements.

    For passkeys and later-operation step-up, use Microsoft-hosted authentication. Do not base this architecture on Embedded native authentication because the External ID support matrix marks both capabilities unsupported there.^3^

    Licensing and security implications

    Conditional Access normally requires Microsoft Entra ID P1.^9^ However, Microsoft documents that the first 50,000 monthly active users in External ID can use MFA and other Premium P1/P2 features for free.^10^ Confirm the exact billing status and applicable add-ons for your external tenant before rollout; SMS has separate charges, while passkey authentication itself has no additional passkey charge.

    Disabling Security Defaults is not inherently a reduction in security if equivalent or stronger Conditional Access policies are enabled immediately. It does transfer responsibility from Microsoft’s fixed baseline to your policy design, testing, monitoring, exclusions, and emergency-access procedures.

    In short: retaining Security Defaults and obtaining the requested action-bound, fresh MFA proof are mutually incompatible requirements. Retain External ID and the existing API authorization layer, but move the authentication requirement to Conditional Access authentication context and validate acrs after full token validation.


    References

    1. Security defaults in Microsoft Entra ID
    2. Developer guide to Conditional Access authentication context
    3. Supported features in Microsoft Entra External ID workforce and external tenants
    4. Conditional Access adaptive session lifetime policies
    5. Secure applications and APIs by validating claims
    6. Sign in with passkeys in Microsoft Entra External ID
    7. Register a Microsoft Entra passkey on Windows
    8. Multifactor authentication in Microsoft Entra External ID external tenants
    9. Microsoft Entra licensing
    10. Features and licenses for Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication
    AI-generated content may be incorrect. Read our transparency notes for more information.

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  2. Günther Schlögl 0 Reputation points
    2026-11-20T04:46:49.0633333+00:00

    Thank you for the detailed explanation.

    Before considering a migration from Security Defaults to Conditional Access, could a Microsoft Entra External ID specialist clarify three remaining points?

    Is Every time strict (preview) currently supported in External ID customer tenants for Microsoft-hosted authentication with a Windows MSAL desktop client and a browser-based PWA? Is there a generally available alternative that allows the backend to verify MFA freshness within a strict five-minute window?

    Does a validated acrs claim combined with Conditional Access provide sufficient evidence of a fresh MFA event, or is an additional mechanism required to prove the time and action-specific nature of the confirmation?

    Can Conditional Access policies providing equivalent baseline protection be prepared and validated before disabling Security Defaults, so that migration does not create a security gap? Does the free 50,000-MAU External ID tier cover the required Conditional Access functionality?

    We cannot weaken our current security requirements or rely on preview functionality for production without a separate assessment.

    Please provide official documentation or confirmation from a Microsoft specialist.

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