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Based on your descriptions, I would like to share with some information that may help you understand more about the concern you observed.
Event ID 4624 with Logon Type 9 (NewCredentials) does not, by itself, indicate that someone remotely logged on to the computer or that the computer has been compromised.
Event ID 4624 indicates that Windows successfully created a logon session.
With Logon Type 9 (NewCredentials), Windows creates a session in which the process continues to use the current user's security context for local access, while a different set of credentials can be supplied for outbound network connections.
A common example is:
runas /netonly /user:CONTOSO\AdminUser powershell.exe
In this example, PowerShell continues to run locally under the current user's local security context. However, when that process accesses a remote resource, such as a file server or another server, Windows can use the CONTOSO\AdminUser credentials for that network connection.
Therefore, Logon Type 9 generally represents the creation of an alternate-credential session on the workstation, rather than an incoming remote logon to the workstation.
Because you are seeing the event after business hours, it is possible that a local background process, scheduled task, management application, script, or other software is creating the NewCredentials session automatically.
For this reason, I would not consider the Type 9 event alone evidence of unauthorized access. However, because you do not currently recognize the activity, it is appropriate to investigate which local process and account created the session.
Rather than trying to block Logon Type 9, I recommend identifying the process responsible for the event.
Open Event Viewer > Windows Logs > Security, locate one of the unexpected Event ID 4624 entries, and review these fields:
- Subject > Account Name / Logon ID: Shows the existing local security context that requested the logon.
- New Logon > Logon ID: Identifies the newly created logon session and can help correlate related security events.
- Network Account Name / Network Account Domain, if populated: Shows the credentials associated with outbound network access.
- Process Information > Process Name / Process ID: Helps identify the application or Windows component that requested the session.
- Logon Process / Authentication Package: Provides additional information about how Windows created the session.
At approximately the same timestamp, also review the Security log for Event ID 4648, which indicates an attempt to log on using explicit credentials. If process creation auditing is enabled, Event ID 4688 can provide additional process information.
Correlating these events provides a more reliable way to determine what generated the Type 9 session than interpreting Event 4624 by itself.
The most useful next step is to take one of the after-hours Type 9 events and identify its Process Name, Subject account, and Network Account, then determine whether the process corresponds to an expected scheduled task, management application, backup software, service, or other installed application.
If the process and account are expected, the event can usually be explained as legitimate background activity.
If the executable or account is unfamiliar, or you find unexpected outbound activity associated with the same session, then further security investigation would be appropriate.
References:
Administrative tools and logon types reference - Windows Server | Microsoft Learn
Advanced Audit Policy Configuration settings | Microsoft Learn
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