What is Windows Security log event Id 4624 type 9: New Credential Login

OHPRS Admin 361 Reputation points
2026-10-30T18:06:00.15+00:00

Event id 4624 is a successful login. Type 9 is described as: "NewCredentials logon, which happens when a user runs a process using the runas command with the /netonly flag."

Can someone give me some better detail on this Type 9? I'm seeing this on a workstation after business hours when no one is in the office. It's making me nervous thinking some is trying to (or is!) breaking into this computer.

Windows for business | Windows 365 Business
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  1. Daphne Huynh (WICLOUD CORPORATION) 2,540 Reputation points Microsoft External Staff Moderator
    2026-10-31T01:58:59.1633333+00:00

    Welcome to Microsoft Q&A!

    Based on your descriptions, I would like to share with some information that may help you understand more about the concern you observed.

    Event ID 4624 with Logon Type 9 (NewCredentials) does not, by itself, indicate that someone remotely logged on to the computer or that the computer has been compromised.

    Event ID 4624 indicates that Windows successfully created a logon session.

    With Logon Type 9 (NewCredentials), Windows creates a session in which the process continues to use the current user's security context for local access, while a different set of credentials can be supplied for outbound network connections.

    A common example is:

    runas /netonly /user:CONTOSO\AdminUser powershell.exe
    

    In this example, PowerShell continues to run locally under the current user's local security context. However, when that process accesses a remote resource, such as a file server or another server, Windows can use the CONTOSO\AdminUser credentials for that network connection.

    Therefore, Logon Type 9 generally represents the creation of an alternate-credential session on the workstation, rather than an incoming remote logon to the workstation.

    Because you are seeing the event after business hours, it is possible that a local background process, scheduled task, management application, script, or other software is creating the NewCredentials session automatically.

    For this reason, I would not consider the Type 9 event alone evidence of unauthorized access. However, because you do not currently recognize the activity, it is appropriate to investigate which local process and account created the session.

    Rather than trying to block Logon Type 9, I recommend identifying the process responsible for the event.

    Open Event Viewer > Windows Logs > Security, locate one of the unexpected Event ID 4624 entries, and review these fields:

    • Subject > Account Name / Logon ID: Shows the existing local security context that requested the logon.
    • New Logon > Logon ID: Identifies the newly created logon session and can help correlate related security events.
    • Network Account Name / Network Account Domain, if populated: Shows the credentials associated with outbound network access.
    • Process Information > Process Name / Process ID: Helps identify the application or Windows component that requested the session.
    • Logon Process / Authentication Package: Provides additional information about how Windows created the session.

    At approximately the same timestamp, also review the Security log for Event ID 4648, which indicates an attempt to log on using explicit credentials. If process creation auditing is enabled, Event ID 4688 can provide additional process information.

    Correlating these events provides a more reliable way to determine what generated the Type 9 session than interpreting Event 4624 by itself.

    The most useful next step is to take one of the after-hours Type 9 events and identify its Process Name, Subject account, and Network Account, then determine whether the process corresponds to an expected scheduled task, management application, backup software, service, or other installed application.

    If the process and account are expected, the event can usually be explained as legitimate background activity.

    If the executable or account is unfamiliar, or you find unexpected outbound activity associated with the same session, then further security investigation would be appropriate.

    References:

    Administrative tools and logon types reference - Windows Server | Microsoft Learn

    Advanced Audit Policy Configuration settings | Microsoft Learn

    If you find it useful, please click Accept Answer.

    Thank you for choosing Microsoft Q&A.

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  2. AI answer

    2026-10-30T18:06:56.2+00:00

    A 4624 Logon Type 9 event does not by itself mean someone remotely entered the workstation; it means a local process cloned its caller’s current token and supplied different credentials for subsequent outbound network connections.^1^

    What “NewCredentials” means

    The resulting process has two security identities:

    • Local access: It retains the identity and permissions of the account that launched it.
    • Network access: When it connects to another computer—such as a file server, SQL Server, or administrative share—it presents the newly supplied credentials.

    The common example is:

    runas /netonly /user:CONTOSO\AdminUser powershell.exe
    

    The new PowerShell process still acts locally as the currently signed-in user, but attempts to use CONTOSO\AdminUser when accessing network resources. Microsoft describes this as cloning the current LSA session for local access while using new credentials for network connections.^2^

    Type 9 also leaves reusable credentials in the Local Security Authority (LSA) session, so an unexplained event deserves investigation—particularly if it names a privileged account.^2^

    Determine what created the after-hours event

    Open Event Viewer → Windows Logs → Security, open the Type 9 event, and examine these fields:

    1. Subject
      • Identifies the local account that requested the new session.
      • SYSTEM suggests that a service, management agent, or scheduled component initiated it; a named user identifies that user’s existing local session.
    2. New Logon
      • Identifies the local identity assigned to the new logon session.
      • Record its Logon ID. That hexadecimal value can correlate related security events.^1^
    3. Process Information
      • Process Name is the most important starting point. runas.exe, a script host, an administration utility, backup software, or another executable can explain who requested the session.
      • Check whether the path and digital signature match installed, approved software.
    4. Network Account Name / Domain
      • On newer event versions, these fields identify the credentials designated for outbound traffic. Windows 10 added TargetOutboundUserName and TargetOutboundUserDomain specifically for this purpose.^3^
      • - or an unavailable value means the event alone may not identify the outbound account.
    5. Events at the same time
      • Look for 4648, which records an attempted logon using explicit credentials.^4^
      • Look for 4688 to identify the process that started. Process-creation auditing must already have been enabled for this event to exist.^5^
      • Correlate events by timestamp, account, process ID, and Logon ID rather than relying on the event number alone.

    This PowerShell query extracts recent Type 9 events without changing audit configuration:

    $start = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
    
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
        LogName   = 'Security'
        Id        = 4624
        StartTime = $start
    } | Where-Object {
        ([xml]$_.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data |
            Where-Object { $_.Name -eq 'LogonType' -and $_.'#text' -eq '9' }
    } | Select-Object TimeCreated, RecordId, Message
    

    Run it from an elevated PowerShell session if access to the Security log is denied.

    When to treat it as suspicious

    Escalate the investigation if any of these are present:

    • The process path is unknown, unsigned, user-writable, or no longer exists.
    • The subject or outbound account is unexpected, disabled, or privileged.
    • Type 9 events recur on a schedule that does not match approved tasks or management software.
    • Related 4688 events show PowerShell, cmd.exe, script hosts, or unfamiliar binaries with unexplained command lines.
    • The same time window contains unexpected outbound connections or successful logons on another computer under the outbound account.

    Conversely, a recognized signed executable associated with an approved scheduled task, backup agent, deployment tool, or administrator workflow can legitimately generate Type 9 while nobody is physically present. The event proves that Windows created a credential-bearing logon session; it does not prove that those credentials were successfully used against another system.


    References

    1. 4624(S): An account was successfully logged on.
    2. Administrative tools and logon types
    3. What's new in Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2015
    4. Windows security baseline
    5. Advanced Audit Policy Configuration
    AI-generated content may be incorrect. Read our transparency notes for more information.

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