An Azure service that is used to collect, analyze, and act on telemetry data from Azure and on-premises environments.
Hi Pieter Jan Coeckelbergh & thx for join me at Q&A platform, I agree with your concern. A verification email pointing to an unfamiliar domain, combined with a page that doesn't resemble the usual Microsoft authentication experience, is exactly the kind of thing security awareness training tells users to question.
Microsoft's Azure Monitor Action Groups documentation confirms that new email recipients must complete OTP verification within 30 minutes. It also lists [email protected] as a legitimate notification sender.
However, I couldn't find an official Microsoft reference explicitly confirming userlinks.azns.microsofticm.com as the verification endpoint. So I wouldn't claim the URL is verified solely because the email sender and page design look plausible.
This is also different from a Microsoft Entra device-code sign-in flow. The page requests an email verification code, not a device authentication code, although the unfamiliar domain creates a similar phishing concern.
I'd recommend that the Azure Monitor team explicitly document the verification domain and link it from the Action Groups documentation. That would help customers validate the endpoint and allow security teams to review it without relying on assumptions.
Until Microsoft confirms the exact URL, users should verify that they actually initiated the Action Group change and avoid entering codes from unexpected emails
rgds,
Alex
p.s. if my answer is help - pls mark it as an answer