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The packet capture makes this look different from an incorrect password, missing OU delegation or network-connectivity problem.
The important sequence is:
- Kerberos authentication succeeds and a TGT is issued.
- A service ticket is issued.
- ANF sends a SASL/GSS-SPNEGO LDAP bind to TCP 389.
- The AP-REQ contains
cifs/<dc-fqdn>rather thanldap/<dc-fqdn>. - LDAP rejects it because the GSSAPI target name does not match an LDAP SPN.
The successful 4768, 4769 and 4624 events, together with the absence of 4625, 4771 and 4776 failures, support your conclusion that the supplied join credentials are not the underlying problem.
It would not be appropriate to “fix” this by registering a nonstandard SPN, weakening LDAP/Kerberos enforcement, or removing the October security updates. Those actions can introduce authentication ambiguity or reduce domain-controller security, and they do not correct which service principal the ANF client requests.
Recommended next steps:
- Keep the Microsoft support case open and provide the packet capture, exact UTC reproduction time, ANF account/volume resource IDs, region, AD connection ID and both domain-controller FQDNs.
- Explicitly call out that the LDAP GSS-SPNEGO AP-REQ uses
cifs/<dc-fqdn>while the bind target is LDAP. - Include the DC error
80090303and the message that the GSSAPI target name does not match an LDAP SPN. - Ask support to verify whether the ANF AD-join implementation is expected to request
ldap/<dc-fqdn>and whether the October 2026 DC servicing change exposed a known ANF compatibility issue. - If possible, reproduce with a temporary AD connection and collect the ANF-side operation/correlation ID. Avoid repeatedly recreating the production AD connection because that is not changing the Kerberos target name.
Enabling LDAP signing, LDAPS or ANF AES encryption does not necessarily change the Kerberos service principal used for the SASL bind. Your captures show that those settings did not alter the failing request, so they should not be presented as a confirmed workaround.
Based on the supplied evidence, a supported resolution likely requires an ANF-side correction or a Microsoft-published mitigation. Only the ANF and Windows servicing teams can confirm whether this is the same interoperability issue documented for ONTAP after the October updates.
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