Coming to this late, but I've been digging into this myself so adding some stuff in case it helps anyone else landing here:
- There is a description, just not on Learn. The policy’s own Explain text in the GPMC editor reads:
This policy allows you to audit system access right enforcement details during account logon. Events in this subcategory are generated on the computer on which account logons are performed. For an interactive logon, the security audit event is generated on the computer that the user logged on to. For a network logon, such as accessing a shared folder on the network, the security audit event is generated on the computer hosting the resource. When this setting is configured for Success audits, one or more security audit events are generated for each successful logon. When this setting is configured for Failure audits, one or more security audit events are generated for explicitly denied logons. When this setting is configured for Failure audits, no security audit events will be generated for implicitly denied logons. You must also enable the Audit Logon setting under Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\System Audit Policies\Logon/Logoff. Multiple events are generated if the access right information cannot fit in a single security audit event. Volume: Low on a client computer. Medium on a domain controller or a network server. Default: No Auditing.
It looks similar to Audit Group Membership — same dependency on Audit Logon, same “multiple events if it won’t fit in one record”, same volume rating. Group Membership logs the group SIDs in the logon token; this one looks to log the access rights enforced during that logon.
2. The GUID is wrong. The answer states Access Rights is {0CCE922A-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}. It isn’t. That GUID belongs to Other Privilege Use Events, under Privilege Use. Access Rights is actually {0CCE924B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}. You can check on any machine with:
auditpol /list /subcategory:* /v
924B is above the highest GUID in MS-GPAC (0CCE9249, Group Membership), which is why the spec doesn’t mention it. It appears to have been added after that document was last revised and I guess M$ haven't got around to updating it yet.
I checked across a mixed estate — Server 2019/Server 2022, domain controllers, member servers, a CA, a Hyper-V host, and Windows 11 workstations. Access Rights was present on every single one. So I don’t think the subcategory itself is build-gated, at least not in any recent range.
The reason I checked is because Microsoft Defender for Endpoint enables this subcategory (Success and Failure) when the Sense service starts. If your GPO leaves it undefined, the Group Policy audit extension strips it a few seconds later, so you get a pair of 4719 events on every boot and a lot of pointless noise in whatever’s monitoring your audit policy. Setting it explicitly in the GPO to match what Defender writes stops that. Same pattern applies to File System and, on our estate, Registry.
Hope that saves someone the afternoon it cost me.