Managing external identities to enable secure access for partners, customers, and other non-employees
Security Defaults cannot enforce fresh, action-specific MFA for your API; the supported External ID design is Conditional Access authentication context, which requires disabling Security Defaults and replacing its baseline protections with Conditional Access policies.^1^
What Security Defaults can and cannot prove
Security Defaults is a Microsoft-managed baseline. Microsoft decides when MFA is necessary based on factors such as the location, device, role, and task. It does not expose controls for:
- Mapping an MFA requirement to one protected API operation.
- Forcing reauthentication within five minutes of that operation.
- Selecting or requiring passkeys.
- Configuring authentication contexts or sign-in frequency.
Consequently, an access token obtained under Security Defaults might represent password-only authentication, as you observed. Repeating an MSAL interactive acquisition or adding a claims challenge cannot create an authentication requirement when no corresponding Conditional Access policy and authentication context exist.
Do not treat these claims as substitutes:
-
iatproves when the token was issued, not when MFA occurred. -
amr, when present, describes authentication methods but does not bind MFA to the protected operation or establish a five-minute policy. -
auth_time, when present, represents an authentication time but does not by itself prove that the authentication satisfied your action-specific security requirement. -
acr/acrsproves a configured authentication context was satisfied. This is the appropriate authorization signal for step-up, but it only exists as a useful guarantee when backed by the relevant Conditional Access policy.^2^
Supported action-specific architecture
For Microsoft-hosted authentication—or BYO UX where its preview status is acceptable—the supported sequence is:
- Disable Security Defaults.
- Recreate its baseline using Conditional Access:
- Require MFA for the necessary customer applications/users.
- Protect tenant administrators separately.
- Preserve legacy-authentication and device-code-flow protections where the external-tenant feature set permits them.
- Maintain emergency-access exclusions.
- Under Entra ID → Protection → Conditional Access → Authentication contexts, create an authentication context, for example
C1: Sensitive administrative operation. - Create a Conditional Access policy targeting that authentication context and requiring MFA.
- Map each sensitive API operation to
C1. - Have the API inspect the validated access token for the matching
acrsvalue. - If absent, return
401 Unauthorizedwith the documentedWWW-Authenticateclaims challenge. - Have both clients pass that challenge to MSAL and repeat the API request with the resulting access token.
External ID explicitly supports additional verification after sign-in through configured authentication context for Microsoft-hosted authentication and BYO UX. Embedded native authentication does not support later-operation step-up or passkeys.^3^
The API check is conceptually:
var contextSatisfied = User.FindAll("acrs")
.Any(c => c.Value == requiredContext);
if (!contextSatisfied)
{
Response.StatusCode = StatusCodes.Status401Unauthorized;
Response.Headers.WWWAuthenticate =
BuildClaimsChallenge(requiredContext);
return;
}
await ExecuteSensitiveOperation();
The production implementation should generate the complete documented challenge and obtain tenant-specific context mappings rather than hard-code them.^2^
Five-minute freshness
Authentication context proves that the configured policy was satisfied, but it is not independently a five-minute timer. Freshness must be enforced through Conditional Access session controls and compatible token acquisition behavior:
- Sign-in frequency: Every time requires full reauthentication when the session is evaluated, but includes five minutes of clock skew and therefore does not mean “MFA occurred no more than exactly five minutes ago.”
- Every time strict has a shorter 10-second validity window, but is currently preview and requires the application to request a new token for the sensitive action. Applying the policy alone is insufficient if the application continues using an existing token or session.^4^
Therefore, an exact, generally available “MFA in the preceding five minutes specifically for this operation” guarantee is not documented for this configuration. The closest supported designs are:
- Authentication context plus Every time, accepting its documented evaluation and clock-skew semantics.
- Authentication context plus Every time strict, if preview features are acceptable and testing confirms support for your application flow.
The API should still perform ordinary token validation: signature, issuer, lifetime, expected tenant, API audience, delegated scope, user subject, and authorized client application. Microsoft specifically requires validating audience, tenant, subject, and actor; access tokens are validated by the API, not the public client.^5^
Passkeys and Windows Hello
Passkeys are suitable as a phishing-resistant MFA method, but External ID currently cannot require them through a Conditional Access authentication strength. A policy can require MFA, and an enrolled user can choose a passkey to satisfy it.^6^
For Windows Hello:
- No separate FIDO2 hardware key or second smartphone is required.
- A device-bound passkey can be held in Windows Hello and unlocked using a PIN, fingerprint, or face.
- The customer must use a supported Windows version and WebAuthn-capable browser.
- Currently, only email-plus-password or username-plus-password local accounts can register passkeys.
- The user must first complete MFA, within the previous five minutes, to register one.
- Your application must provide a credential-management experience.
- Passkeys must be enabled in Entra ID → Security → Authentication methods → Policies → Passkey (FIDO2).
- Windows Hello device-bound passkeys require the applicable Windows Hello AAGUIDs to be allowed; attestation must not be enforced for the documented Windows registration scenario.^7^
This enrollment requirement creates a bootstrap issue: an existing MFA method is required before the first passkey can be registered. You therefore need at least one supported initial method, such as email OTP, TOTP, or SMS where applicable. SMS is an additional-cost External ID feature.^8^
Desktop client and PWA
The same API authorization model can support both:
- The Windows public client handles the
WWW-Authenticatechallenge through MSAL and Microsoft-hosted browser authentication. - The browser PWA uses an OAuth/OIDC browser flow and handles the same claims challenge.
- Both request tokens for the same API and the API enforces the same
aud,tid,scp, client identity, user identity, andacrsrequirements.
For passkeys and later-operation step-up, use Microsoft-hosted authentication. Do not base this architecture on Embedded native authentication because the External ID support matrix marks both capabilities unsupported there.^3^
Licensing and security implications
Conditional Access normally requires Microsoft Entra ID P1.^9^ However, Microsoft documents that the first 50,000 monthly active users in External ID can use MFA and other Premium P1/P2 features for free.^10^ Confirm the exact billing status and applicable add-ons for your external tenant before rollout; SMS has separate charges, while passkey authentication itself has no additional passkey charge.
Disabling Security Defaults is not inherently a reduction in security if equivalent or stronger Conditional Access policies are enabled immediately. It does transfer responsibility from Microsoft’s fixed baseline to your policy design, testing, monitoring, exclusions, and emergency-access procedures.
In short: retaining Security Defaults and obtaining the requested action-bound, fresh MFA proof are mutually incompatible requirements. Retain External ID and the existing API authorization layer, but move the authentication requirement to Conditional Access authentication context and validate acrs after full token validation.
References
- Security defaults in Microsoft Entra ID
- Developer guide to Conditional Access authentication context
- Supported features in Microsoft Entra External ID workforce and external tenants
- Conditional Access adaptive session lifetime policies
- Secure applications and APIs by validating claims
- Sign in with passkeys in Microsoft Entra External ID
- Register a Microsoft Entra passkey on Windows
- Multifactor authentication in Microsoft Entra External ID external tenants
- Microsoft Entra licensing
- Features and licenses for Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication