A cloud-based identity and access management service for securing user authentication and resource access
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs does not document a per-secret or per-certificate key identifier, so exact credential attribution for delegated non-interactive user events requires either application-side telemetry or a credential architecture that makes the credential unambiguous.
Q1: Credential ID in user-context sign-in logs
The documented user-log schema includes ClientCredentialType, FederatedCredentialId, and AuthenticationProcessingDetails, but not ServicePrincipalCredentialKeyId or a certificate-thumbprint field. AuthenticationProcessingDetails is documented only as authentication-processor details; no documented key/value identifies the client secret or certificate used ^1^.
By contrast, the service-principal schema explicitly provides:
-
ServicePrincipalCredentialKeyId -
ServicePrincipalCredentialThumbprint -
FederatedCredentialId
Therefore:
- Your FIC correlation is supported by the documented
FederatedCredentialId. - There is no documented equivalent for distinguishing multiple secrets or certificates in a delegated
nonInteractiveUserevent. - Querying sign-ins through Microsoft Graph or Graph PowerShell changes the access method, not the underlying event’s documented fields ^3^.
Q2: Alternative telemetry
The closest supported per-credential inventory is:
- Entra admin center → Entra ID → Monitoring & health → Usage & insights → Application credential activity.
- Review credential type, last-used date, expiration, application/service-principal origin, and identifiers.
- For automation, use the Microsoft Graph beta
appCredentialSignInActivityresource, which can be retrieved byid,keyId, andappId^4^.
This provides last credential activity, not a transaction-by-transaction join to a delegated user sign-in.
Also use these complementary controls:
- Unused/expiring credential recommendations: preview recommendations identify unused and expiring application credentials. Graph access to recommendations uses
DirectoryRecommendations.Read.All; updates requireDirectoryRecommendations.ReadWrite.All^5^. - Workload Identity Protection: with at least Security Reader, inspect ID Protection → Risky workload identities. Its detections include leaked credentials, suspicious sign-ins, unusual credential type, and suspicious API traffic. Full details and risk-based controls require Workload Identities Premium ^6^.
These are risk and lifecycle signals; they do not restore per-secret attribution to the delegated non-interactive user event.
Q3: Key Vault audit semantics
Key Vault auditing is recommended for determining who retrieved or operated on a secret, but it cannot prove which cached value was presented to Entra for every subsequent token request. Microsoft explicitly recommends application-side caching to reduce Key Vault calls, so the expected relationship is one SecretGet followed by potentially many token requests ^7^.
Enable AuditEvent diagnostics:
az monitor diagnostic-settings create \
--name myDiagnosticSettings \
--resource <key-vault-resource-id> \
--logs '[{"category":"AuditEvent","enabled":true}]' \
--workspace <log-analytics-workspace-id>
This records operations such as SecretGet, including time, requesting identity, caller IP, result, and request/secret URI ^8^.
Treat these logs as secret-retrieval evidence, not Entra credential-use evidence. Secure the design with:
- Managed identity for vault access.
- Azure RBAC and least privilege; avoid legacy access policies for critical workloads.
- Separate vaults by application/environment.
- Private endpoints or firewall restrictions.
- Soft delete, purge protection, rotation, audit logging, and alerts ^9^.
Validation procedure
- In a controlled test, use each credential independently.
- Wait for log/report ingestion.
- Confirm its
keyIdand last-used activity in Application credential activity. - If Key Vault-backed, retrieve each secret version once and verify the corresponding
SecretGet. - Confirm that the delegated sign-in still exposes only credential type/FIC ID—not secret
keyId. - Record application instance, secret version, deployment, and token-request correlation ID in application telemetry. That is the practical source for 1:1 attribution when Entra does not emit it.
Q4: Recommended architecture and incident response
Microsoft recommends moving away from password- or certificate-based authentication toward token-based authentication:
- Use managed identity for Azure-hosted workloads.
- Use federated identity credentials for supported external workloads.
- If migration is not yet possible, keep secrets in Key Vault, limit their lifetime, rotate them, scan repositories, and enforce application-management policies. Premium licensing is required for application authentication policy management ^10^.
Where secrets remain and definitive attribution is required, use a separate app/service principal per workload or deployment boundary, or allow only one active production credential except during a tightly controlled rotation window. This makes sign-in attribution operationally unambiguous even when the user log omits keyId.
For suspected compromise:
- Inventory credentials on both application and service-principal objects.
- Review sign-in anomalies, target resources, and audit events for Update Application – Certificates and secrets management ^11^.
- Add and validate a replacement identity or credential end to end.
- Confirm rollback access and coordinate with workload owners.
- Remove the suspected credential; if the identity itself is at risk, remove all existing credentials and rotate Key Vault secrets accessible to it.
- For urgent confirmed compromise, disable the service principal to contain access.
Warning: disabling a service principal or revoking active credentials can immediately stop production authentication. In routine rotation, validate the replacement before revocation; in emergency containment, accept and document any outage risk deliberately.
References
- AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
- AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
- Microsoft Graph PowerShell cmdlets for Microsoft Entra monitoring and health
- What is the Usage and insights report in Microsoft Entra ID?
- Microsoft Entra recommendation: Remove unused credentials from apps (preview)
- Securing workload identities
- Azure Key Vault developer's guide
- Azure Key Vault logging
- Secure your Azure Key Vault
- Migrate applications away from secret-based authentication
- Compromised and malicious applications investigation