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Thank you for taking the time to provide such a detailed reproduction, including the timing measurements, event-log observations, and the clean test using the built-in Password Credential Provider without a third-party credential provider.
Based on the evidence you collected, this does not appear to be a normal incorrect-password or Active Directory authentication failure.
The most important observation is that the failing credential submission does not produce the expected 4624, 4625, or 4648 authentication events, while the same credentials succeed after LogonUI returns to the normal workstation-unlock state. Your clean reproduction also makes a third-party credential provider much less likely to be responsible for the behavior.
- Explanation
Windows credential providers operate according to a usage scenario supplied by LogonUI through ICredentialProvider::SetUsageScenario.
In this case, the relevant scenarios are CPUS_LOGON and CPUS_UNLOCK_WORKSTATION. CPUS_UNLOCK_WORKSTATION represents the workstation-unlock scenario, while CPUS_LOGON is associated with the logon/unlock sign-in experience.
The HideFastUserSwitching policy is a computer-level policy, so its state applies to the device's sign-in experience rather than to an individual user.
Your trace shows a very specific sequence:
-
HideFastUserSwitchingis temporarily absent while Group Policy registry processing is occurring. - The workstation is locked during that interval.
-
LogonUIinitializes and the credential provider receivesCPUS_LOGON. -
HideFastUserSwitchingis subsequently restored to 1. - The existing LogonUI instance remains in the previously initialized state.
- Submitting the correct password then returns
0xC000006D(STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE) with0xC00000E5(STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR). - No corresponding LSA authentication event is recorded for that failed submission.
- After the sign-in UI returns to the lock-screen curtain and the credential providers are enumerated again under the unlock scenario, the same credentials successfully unlock the existing session and generate logon type 7.
Taken together, these observations are consistent with a timing-sensitive LogonUI/Winlogon state issue occurring around Group Policy processing, rather than evidence that the user's password is actually invalid.
However, there is an important distinction here: this is an interpretation of the behavior demonstrated by your traces. It should not be treated as confirmation that Microsoft has documented this as a Windows 11 24H2 known issue or confirmed product defect.
Unfortunately, I could not find public Microsoft documentation confirming that the temporary removal of this particular registry value during Registry CSE processing, followed by this STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE / STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR sequence, is documented or expected behavior.
- Workaround
For the condition you reproduced, I recommend using the recovery procedure that your testing has already demonstrated to work:
Dismiss the "The password is incorrect" dialog, stop interacting with the sign-in screen, wait until the lock-screen curtain returns, and then unlock the workstation again.
Do not continuously retry the password or leave the error dialog displayed.
Based on your reproduction, retrying while the same LogonUI state remains active continues to fail. Once the lock-screen curtain returns, the credential providers are enumerated again and the subsequent authentication proceeds as a normal workstation unlock.
I would not recommend changing Registry Group Policy processing options specifically to solve this issue because I could not find Microsoft documentation establishing such a configuration change as a supported workaround for this condition.
- Next validation step
After reproducing the issue, dismiss the error dialog and leave the sign-in screen idle until the lock-screen curtain returns.
Then unlock the workstation with the same credentials and confirm that the successful attempt generates Security event 4624 with logon type 7.
That would provide a useful validation that the failure is associated with the transient sign-in state rather than with the validity of the user's credentials.
- Important notes
I understand that the workaround alone may not be a satisfactory resolution, especially when this can occur repeatedly in an enterprise environment. The evidence you collected is detailed enough that it is reasonable to want to know whether this is expected Windows behavior and, if not, whether Microsoft can correct it.
However, there is an important limitation to what can be established through Microsoft Q&A.
Microsoft Q&A is a public technical community forum. It is suitable for discussing documented Windows behavior, reviewing configurations, interpreting logs and published documentation, and suggesting documented troubleshooting steps or workarounds.
This particular case goes beyond those boundaries because the remaining questions concern the internal interaction between the Group Policy Registry client-side extension, LogonUI, Winlogon, credential-provider usage-scenario selection, and authentication processing.
Specifically, answering the following questions definitively would require product-level investigation:
- whether temporarily removing and recreating
HideFastUserSwitchingduring Registry CSE processing is expected implementation behavior. - whether
LogonUI/Winlogonshould independently recognize the existing locked console session when the registry value is temporarily unavailable. - whether Winlogon should reconsider the current credential-provider usage scenario after receiving
STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR. - whether the Registry policy update and LogonUI initialization are experiencing an unintended race condition
- whether Windows should be changed to prevent or recover automatically from this state.
Those questions cannot be answered reliably by examining public documentation alone. A forum reply also cannot determine the internal Windows execution path from source code, perform private debugging of Winlogon/LogonUI, confirm that an observed implementation detail is "by design," or classify the behavior as a Windows product defect requiring a servicing change.
For that reason, I do not want to label this definitively as a Windows 11 24H2 bug based only on the reproduction, even though the evidence strongly isolates the condition. Doing so would go beyond what can be supported by the currently available documentation.
If you require a root-cause determination or permanent product-level resolution, the appropriate next step would be to open a Microsoft Support request.
Your existing data should be particularly useful for that investigation because you already have:
- a deterministic reproduction.
- a reproduction without a third-party credential provider.
- timestamps showing the registry-value transition.
- the observed
CPUS_LOGONversusCPUS_UNLOCK_WORKSTATIONbehavior. - the 0xC000006D / 0xC00000E5 result.
- confirmation that no corresponding LSA authentication events occur during the failed submission.
- confirmation that the same credentials subsequently succeed as logon type 7.
That level of evidence should allow the issue to be investigated beyond what can reasonably be established in a public forum.
I realize this does not provide the definitive explanation or permanent fix you were hoping for. However, I would rather be transparent about the limits of what can be confirmed from published documentation than present an interpretation of internal Windows behavior as an official Microsoft product conclusion.
References:
CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER_USAGE_SCENARIO (credentialprovider.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Learn
nuget.exe Credential Providers | Microsoft Learn
CredentialProviders Policy CSP | Microsoft Learn
Configure Windows Hello for Business | Microsoft Learn
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