Hola Ilias,
I think there are two different issues here, and I wouldn’t jump to rebuilding DFSR or recreating DHCP failover yet.
For DHCP, your error helps a lot:
Invoke-DhcpServerv4FailoverReplication
Failed to enumerate failover relationships...
WIN32 5 - Access Denied
Because it fails while enumerating the relationships, before replication even starts, I’d first treat this as a management/API authorization problem rather than a failover transport problem. Microsoft’s DHCP failover documentation requires that the command be run with elevated administrative rights on the DHCP server.
So the simplest thing I’d verify is that the PowerShell session is elevated and the account is a local Administrator on the DHCP server named in -ComputerName. I’d also try the command locally on that DHCP server from an elevated PowerShell window.
I would not rebuild the failover relationship just because one view shows an FQDN and another shows an IP address. Microsoft explicitly allows the failover partner to be configured using a NetBIOS name, DNS name, or IP address, so that representation isn’t inherently invalid.
The fact that the relationship itself reports State = Normal and TCP 647 succeeds also argues against the partner identity being the first thing to change.
The DFSR side is more interesting.
Event 5002 with Error 5, combined with a 4625 on the receiving partner for the remote computer account, indicates that DFSR is reaching the authentication stage and that the machine-account logon is being rejected. A healthy Test-ComputerSecureChannel doesn’t completely rule that out because DFSR runs as Local System and authenticates using the computer account, while your interactive Kerberos tests are using your user context.
I would not do a D2 restore at this point. A non-authoritative DFSR restore repairs the replicated data state; it won’t fix a Kerberos/machine-account authentication failure.
One change that is especially relevant in 2026 is Microsoft’s Kerberos RC4 hardening. The July 2026 security updates moved Windows domain controllers into enforcement mode for the RC4 changes related to CVE-2026-20833. Microsoft specifically warns that workloads still depending on RC4 can begin failing authentication once enforcement is active.
I’d check the two DFSR server computer accounts for AES support: Get-ADComputer SERVERNAME -Properties msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes | Select-Object Name,msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
If one of those upgraded machine accounts doesn’t have usable AES keys or has stale encryption-type metadata, that could explain why a machine-account Kerberos logon is failing even though ordinary connectivity looks healthy. Microsoft specifically notes that older accounts may need their password/key material regenerated to create modern AES keys. For a computer account, the supported way to do that is to reset the machine-account password: Reset-ComputerMachinePassword -Server <DCName> -Credential (Get-Credential)
I would only do that on one affected DFSR server first, during a maintenance window, and then reboot it. That is much less destructive than rebuilding DFSR and directly addresses the identity that your 4625 event says is failing.
Before doing even that, though, there’s one field from Event 4625 that would be very useful: SubStatus. 0xC000006D is only the generic STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE code. Microsoft documents that SubStatus usually indicates whether the failure is due to a bad password, an unknown account, a logon restriction, etc.
Thanks,
James